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ABSTRACT
Uncertainties run deep during a crisis. Yet, leaders will have to make critical
decisions in the absence of information they would like to have. How do
political leaders cope with this challenge? One way to deal with crisis-
induced uncertainty is to base all decisions on a core principle or value. This
is what we call a principled approach. The pragmatist approach offers an
alternative: an experimental, trial-and-error strategy based on quick feedback.
In this paper, we consider both approaches in light of the COVID-19
experience in four European countries. We conclude that the pragmatic
approach may be superior, in theory, but is hard to effectuate in practice. We
discuss implications for the practice of strategic crisis management.
KEYWORDS Strategic crisis management; political leadership; COVID-19; pragmatism
Introduction: categorizing strategic approaches to crisis
management
The COVID-19 crisis has presented political leaders everywhere with extreme
governance challenges. They had to contain a mysterious virus, with limited
data, widely varying estimates, unexpected capacity shortfalls, and intense
contestation about interventions whose intended and unintended conse-
quences were unknown.
The uncertainties ran deep. There was uncertainty with regard to the main
channels of transmission, whether successful recovery would lead to immu-
nity from future infections, if and how the virus might mutate. There was
uncertainty about the number of people infected, the number of people
who would require intensive care, the number of potential fatalities or the
long-term effects of the virus on recovered patients (‘long-COVID’), the avail-
able capacities in healthcare facilities, or the economic and social
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consequences that various policy options would imply. Policy-makers were
faced with indicators (such as the now infamous reproductive R number)
and new policy ideas (‘flatten the curve’, ‘hammer and dance’) that seemed
simple but were easy to misunderstand.
The existing playbook on how to manage pandemics was soon found
wanting. Yet, critical decisions had to be made. Crisis leaders had to decide
whether borders, schools and restaurants should be closed, whether
people could go to work, whether businesses should be financially sup-
ported. Tough dilemmas had to be resolved: limit hospital access to
COVID-19 patients or scale regular care down (sending cancer patients
home and postponing operations)? Should leaders go in ‘hard and early’ or
try to control the outbreak and keep the economy going? Such decisions
had to be made without recourse to accurate information, let alone policy-rel-
evant evidence. Political leaders were navigating the biggest crisis of our
times in what crisis researchers call the ‘fog of war’.
We know quite a lot about the decision-making processes that play out
under normal conditions in the offices and hallways of executive buildings,
giving rise to fateful decisions. While we have quite a few hypotheses
about crisis decision-making, we don’t really know how crisis leaders
approach this challenge in practice. The COVID-19 crisis provides a unique
opportunity to compare and explore how national crisis leaders responded
to the same megacrisis, operating under very similar levels of uncertainty.
In this paper, we explore the analytical merits of two ideal-typical
approaches to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty: the prin-
cipled and the pragmatic approach (Ansell & Boin, 2019). The principled
approach adopts a guiding principle (‘minimise harm’, ‘minimise restrictions
on economic and social life’) and applies it consequently to every decision
that forces itself on the agenda. The pragmatist approach rejects the idea
that a principle should shape decision-making in times of uncertainty. It pro-
poses an experimental, trial-and-error strategy that relies on a mixture of
reasoning and feedback: try something that appears likely to work, study
the consequences, and adjust where necessary.1
To deepen our understanding of these two approaches, this paper
explores leadership approaches to COVID-19 in four European states: the
UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The leaders of the UK and
Sweden adopted a principled approach (but applied very different guiding
principles). The Netherlands and Germany started out with a more pragma-
tist-oriented approach, but migrated towards a principled approach. To be
sure, this paper does not seek to evaluate different national responses (the
available data is still scarce and problematic). The contribution of this
paper is to explore whether a theoretically derived distinction has analytical
purchase in understanding how national crisis leaders design response trajec-
tories under conditions of uncertainty.
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We begin by outlining the two ideal-typical approaches to crisis decision-
making. We then describe the responses of the four countries in more detail.
We explore the differences between the approaches and introduce three
factors that may help to explain the initial adoption of the approaches and
the subsequent shifts (or lack thereof) as the crisis developed. We end by
asking whether either approach has demonstrated advantages that leaders
could take into account when confronting their next crisis.
A key leadership challenge in crisis: taming uncertainty
How do leaders cope with uncertainty in a highly dynamic and threat-filled
environment? In Roman times, it was normal to have an esteemed official
dissect a bird and ordain certainty based on a reading of the bird’s entrails.
The role of priests and shamans has given way to an era of expertise in
which rationality is the key norm. Policymakers are trained to collect as
much information as possible, analyse that information using ‘evidence-
based’ models and theories, and draw inferences. Such ambitions are
reflected in the investment in data collection and data analysts, prob-
ability-handlers and modelers, as well as the ubiquity of cost–benefit analysis.
Such claims may sound reassuringly technocratic in front of rolling
cameras and the finger-thumping twitterazzi. But they have always been at
odds with reality. Elaborate information-gathering tools and high-powered
processing technologies cannot solve ‘wicked problems’ (Lodge & Hood,
2010). In a world of wicked policy problems, few certainties exist with
regard to causal relations, probabilities and potential impacts of policy sol-
utions (Daviter, 2019; Peters, 2015; Rittel & Webber, 1973). In a world of
bounded rationality at the individual and collective level, the unquestioned
reliance on rational approaches tends to generate its own blind spots
(Bach & Wegrich, 2019) and unintended consequences (Merton, 1936; cf.
Lodge & Wegrich, 2016).
An approach that is based on complete information is particularly ill-suited
for the world of crisis (Boin et al., 2016). Uncertainty with regard to causes,
dynamics and potential consequences is, by definition, a key problem in a
crisis (Rosenthal et al., 1989). The information that decision-makers would
like to have is simply not available. There is no time to collect more infor-
mation, to consult widely or to ‘sit out the problem’. Moreover, it is not
immediately clear when information will become available nor is it clear
whether new information is accurate. This places decision-makers in an unen-
viable position: they have to make quick decisions without much indication
as to the effectiveness of their decisions and possible side-effects.
Yehezkel Dror (2001) described decision-making under conditions of
uncertainty as ‘fuzzy gambling’ (without understanding the odds). The predi-
cament for crisis decision-makers is worsened by the knowledge that their
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decisions may have deadly consequences. They are fully aware that they will
be held accountable for their decisions after the immediate crisis has been
overcome (Boin et al., 2008; Hood, 2011). Yet, theymustmake a decision, now.
To explore how crisis leaders approach this ‘fuzzy gambling’, we introduce
two ideal-typical approaches: the principled and the pragmatist approach
(Ansell & Bartenberger, 2019; Ansell & Boin, 2019). In theory, both approaches
have political and administrative advantages. Both approaches come with
their own distinct Achilles’ heel that are likely to be exploited by opponents
(Bach & Wegrich, 2019; Lodge, 2019). Let’s see how these approaches could
be used in a crisis and consider their pros and cons from a political-adminis-
trative perspective.
Coping with uncertainty: principled versus pragmatist approaches
One way to deal with crisis-induced uncertainty is to base all decisions on a
core principle or value. We call this a principled approach (Ansell & Bartenber-
ger, 2019). For instance, a decision-maker may use ‘freedom’ or ‘efficiency’ as
a guiding principle when facing a conundrum. During the COVID-19 crisis, we
saw two types of crisis response that resembled a principled approach: one
that prioritized public health (protect as many people as possible from the
virus) and one that prioritized economic well-being. In both types of
responses, other values played a role but there was one overriding value.
The principled approach corresponds with a theoretical perspective on
crisis management that was long popular among social scientists who
studied political leadership during international crises. They viewed political
leadership in terms of making critical decisions – ‘do or die’ decisions that
determined the outcome of a conflict situation (cf. Hermann, 1963). This deci-
sionist approach to crisis management has gradually given rise to a more con-
textualized approach (Allison, 1971; Ansell et al., 2014; Brecher, 1993;
Rosenthal, Charles and ’t Hart, 1987).
The principled approach offers some distinct attractions for crisis leaders.
The embrace of a dominant value removes all complexities and vagaries that
come with an implicit set of undefined values. There is no need to trade one
value off against another. It facilitates, even invites, the use of sweeping
rhetoric that is often expected from leaders in times of crises. Moreover,
the adoption of a single or dominant value fits well with a so-called
command-and-control model, in which unity of purpose, emanating from
the top, serves to relieve implementing bureaucracies of the need to consider
multiple values and interests (cf. Parker et al., 2019). In sum, the principled
approach feeds the image of a ‘war machine’ – strategy and implementation
fused into an all-out response to the crisis at hand.
The principled approach has some disadvantages. A principled approach is
a binary approach. An all-out choice for one value (public safety) immediately
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implies a (at least temporary) disregard for, or downplaying of, other values
(economy, freedom, efficiency). A principled approach implies a certain
degree of inflexibility. But a prolonged crisis is likely to shift in nature and
render formulated strategies invalid. It may, then, be politically infeasible to
perform a sudden U-turn. This is especially the case when leaders issue
sweeping statements that underscore the all-important nature of the
chosen value.
The pragmatist approach to dealing with crisis-induced uncertainty is very
different from the principled approach. In fact, it was formulated as an
alternative to precisely that approach. A small band of American thinkers
(William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, George Herbert Mead and later
John Dewey) saw the unquestioned adherence to ‘principles’ as a driver of
the Civil War they had lived through (Menand, 2001). The Pragmatists formu-
lated an alternative approach to deal with upheaval and uncertainty (see
Ansell [2011] for an engaging analysis). To be sure, the Pragmatists had
nothing to say about political crisis management. But their approach had a
lot to say about the challenges of protracted uncertainty and the ‘quest for
certainty’ that policymakers so often pursue (Ansell & Boin, 2019; Dewey,
1929; Farjoun et al., 2015).
In essence, Pragmatists believe that reality cannot be known by collecting
and analysing ever-more information. They put a premium on discovery
through action (for which they use the term ‘enactment’). In a situation of
uncertainty, you can learn about the environment you seek to negotiate by
acting. It helps if you start by forming a mental picture of the possible
state of play (a working hypothesis). Doing something will inevitably
trigger a reaction (or an unsuspected non-reaction), which tells you some-
thing about that environment. The working hypothesis is confirmed or
needs to be adjusted. By acting and reacting, you can learn and adjust. The
Pragmatist approach thus resembles a scientific approach to solving a
research puzzle. Feedback is very important in this approach: you need to
understand what the reaction is to your action. Uncertainty is tamed by con-
stant interaction with the environment.
In theory, there are some clear advantages to this Pragmatist approach to
political crisis management. First, and most importantly, it seems much
more realistic. The Pragmatist approach accepts uncertainty, which is, by
definition, a key feature of a large-scale crisis. It saves decision-makers
from paralysis, as it does not require a complete picture of the situation
before decisions can be made. The Pragmatist approach provides
decision-makers with flexibility: they can make U-turns without burning pol-
itical capital. It protects political leaders against making costly and hard-to-
reverse decisions.
If this is such a superior approach, why would political leaders not embrace
it more often? One answer is the communication challenge that this
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approach creates for political leaders. If people look to their leaders in times
of crisis, as conventional wisdom has it, they may not want to learn that their
leaders are ‘embracing uncertainty’, initiating experiments to ‘discover’ the
nature of the crisis, and are ready to change a rule or policy the day after it
has been declared. In other words, this approach assumes a societal prefer-
ence for small incremental steps that simply may not exist. Moreover, it
does not fit conceptions of leadership that emphasize strength, stamina,
and decisiveness. This brings us to a perhaps unfortunate paradox: while
the Pragmatist approach can only work with a daring and strong leader,
the principled approach is the one that will make a leader look daring and
strong.
It is not just the political presentational costs that stand in the way of a
pragmatist approach towards crisis management. The pragmatist approach
builds on a very technocratic view of the world in which administrative
and political fine-tuning is feasible, even under conditions of deep uncer-
tainty. The reliance on immediate feedback processes requires reliable
data-flows, processing-capacity and a speedy adaptive response.
In light of the prerequisites for a pragmatic approach, the attractions of
a principled approach come back into view. The latter approach elimin-
ates the costs of extensive information gathering by reducing decision-
making to one single rough indicator: ‘will the system cope’ (in the
COVID-19 crisis, one dominant indicator related to the number of avail-
able IC-beds). In other words, the principled approach explicitly econom-
izes (rationalizes) on rationality (Hood & Lodge, 2005). To be sure, the
principled approach is not devoid of learning and adaptation. It may, in
fact, provide breathing space so as to enable learning without the need
for constant fine-tuning.
Table 1. Contrasting principled and pragmatist approaches.
Principled approach Pragmatist approach
Central theme Choose central value, adjust
policies solely to maximize this
value




Signals clear leadership and
‘vision’, ‘making big calls’
Avoids the necessity of embarrassing U-




High ‘sunk costs’ lead to concerns
over subsequent U-turns
Initial reaction may be qualified
as an ‘over-reaction’ in ex-post
inquiry
Difficulty to justify ongoing
experimentation in view of other
approaches
Lack of ‘clear message’
Administrative pre-
requisites
Capability to support overarching
aim
Capability to continuously monitor and
respond in view of ongoing analysis
Achilles’ heel Other values are discounted,
leading to opposition and
neglect of other concerns
Reliance on feedback mechanisms and fine-
tuned administrative capacities
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Table 1 summarizes the key elements of the two approaches. It highlights
political advantages and disadvantages, administrative pre-requisites and the
most prominent weakness of these two approaches.
In Table 2, we develop an initial set of indicators to guide our empirical dis-
cussion of different national experiences during the COVID-19 crisis. We dis-
tinguish between three phases: the initial phase of the crisis, the ‘wait and
see’ phase, and the phase that marked the end of the first wave and a
search for an exit strategy.
In the following section, we will investigate whether these operationalized
ideal-types have any analytical purchase. We also want to identify factors that
may affect the adoption of either approach (or cause a shift from one to the
other). Building on our theoretical discussion, we identify three types of
factors that might help to explain patterns across the four countries: per-
ceived uncertainty about COVID-19, administrative feasibility, and political
necessity. Perceived uncertainty relates to the emerging knowledge regard-
ing the properties of COVID-19 and its potential impact on individuals and
societies. Administrative feasibility refers to the ability of administrative
systems to facilitate either the principled or pragmatic approach. Political
necessity refers to the demands on politicians that push for a principled
approach or enable the use of a pragmatist approach.
Exploring four national responses to COVID-19
In this section, we briefly describe the trajectory of COVID-19 decision-making
in four European countries (building on publicly available information). We
use these case vignettes for the sole purpose of exploring the usefulness of
the categorization in pragmatist and principled decision-making styles. We
ask whether these ideal-typical approaches can help us describe and
compare the different leadership approaches witnessed over the course of




economic well-being variant Pragmatist approach
Initial
phase
Early decision to reduce social
interactions to minimize
threat to public health


















of measures in light of
feedback and emerging
evidence
Easing Relaxation only if measures
proven to be ‘safe’
Emphasize economic
strength and relative gains
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the COVID-19 crisis. We concentrate on the first wave (March–May
2020) during which uncertainty remained high and new challenges kept
emerging.
We selected four European countries that struck us as particularly interest-
ing: Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. The leaders
of these countries formulated approaches that could be easily classified
according to our pragmatist-principled categorization. These countries also
displayed a variance in dynamics, which differed from the stringent
approaches that most European countries maintained during the first wave
(see Table 3).
As we will see, the response strategies of these four countries show some
interesting similarities. They also diverged at critical junctures. Each country
entered the crisis (we take the first COVID death as the beginning of the
crisis) with an institutional structure designed to respond to pandemics. Pol-
itical leaders quickly discovered, however, that the available expertise – cap-
tured in protocols and pandemic planning – did not offer effective
prescriptions for situations in which many people had contracted the virus
and stayed asymptomatic (WHO, 2006).
Politicians all faced the same challenge at this point: they had to decide
what to do – close borders, impose social distancing, reason with the
public or do nothing – without having the necessary information to make
those decisions. Interestingly, the four countries by and large arrived at the
same crisis regime: people were asked to stay home, social congregation
was prohibited or curtailed, schools and nursing homes were closed (only
in Sweden primary schools did not close and restaurants were allowed to
stay open). People were not confined to their homes for indefinite periods
Table 3. Overview of stringency level from 17 European countries in March 2020.
Country First case reported
Stringency level
1st March 15th March 31st March
Austria 25 February 11.11 48.15 81.48
Belgium 4 February 11.11 50.93 81.48
Denmark 27 February 11.11 65.74 72.22
France 24 January 34.72 49.54 87.96
Germany 27 January 25 32.87 76.85
Ireland 29 February 11.11 48.15 85.19
Iceland 28 February 16.67 25 53.70
Italy 31 January 69.91 85.19 91.67
Luxembourg 29 February 0 53.70 79.63
Netherlands 27 February 0 54.63 79.63
Norway 26 February 11.11 51.85 79.63
Poland 4 March 11.11 57.41 81.48
Portugal 2 March 11.11 32.41 82.41
Spain 31 January 11.11 67.13 85.19
Sweden 31 January 0 27.78 53.70
United Kingdom 29 January 11.11 12.96 79.63
Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.
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of time and some economic activities were allowed to continue. Each country
then entered a period of ‘sacrifice and patience’ –waiting for the crisis regime
to take effect.
Each country eventually managed to bring ‘the curve’ (reproduction rates,
hospitalization, fatalities) down, but the speed by which this was accom-
plished differed. It follows that the timing of the exit strategies differed as
well: Germany and the Netherlands led the way; the United Kingdom
trailed behind and Sweden never did exit its crisis regime.
We will very briefly characterize the crisis trajectories of these four
countries, roughly distinguishing between three phases: the early crisis
phase (the first two weeks after the first death), the ‘crisis regime’ phase
(when the country is awaiting the results of the imposed measures) and
the exit phase (between the announcement of the first relaxation and the
first return to normal). These admittedly very rough distinctions work as a
heuristic device to identify shifts in the chosen crisis approach.
The Netherlands2
The Dutch initially responded to the coronavirus in a way that closely
resembled a pragmatic approach. The Dutch started out by adhering to
WHO guidelines. People who felt sick were admonished to stay home and
large-scale events were cancelled. In the first major press conference on
COVID-19 (9 March), prime minister Mark Rutte and the chief of the Outbreak
Management Team, Jaap van Dissel, told the Dutch to wash their hands,
sneeze in their elbow and avoid shaking hands. Walking off the stage,
Rutte shook hands with Van Dissel to the general amusement of journalists
present.
Within the week, it became clear that the WHO approach was not working.
The number of hospital admissions was exploding. Prime minister Rutte
assumed control over the national crisis response. He acknowledged that
he knew little: ‘we have to make 100% of the decisions with only 50% of
the information’. A complete picture of the situation would not emerge
anytime soon, as the testing capacity was rather limited and health auth-
orities had all but given up on ‘tracking and tracing’ those who had been
in touch with a Corona patient. But action of some sort was clearly required.
The Dutch health system ran the risk of being overwhelmed.
On 16 March, Rutte went on TV to explain the situation. He found a com-
plete lockdown as had been imposed in China and Italy unrealistic and not
fitting the ‘sober Dutch’. While the health system had to be safeguarded,
the same was true for the Dutch economy. So Rutte proposed a set of
measures that amounted to a ‘lockdown light’ – people were admonished
(but not forced) to stay home, while most stores stayed open and large indus-
tries and construction were allowed to continue. Schools, bars and
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 9
restaurants were closed. Rutte promised flexibility. He offered the analogy of
a sick patient: the medicine would be adjusted as the health of the patient
declined or improved. If everybody worked together to ‘flatten the curve’,
measures could be soon relaxed. But if the Dutch ignored the measures, a
full lockdown would be in the offing. The Dutch could ‘earn’ their way out
of the crisis by displaying good behaviour, the prime minister seemed to
suggest. After a few weeks, the measures were tightened a bit more but a
complete lockdown would not happen until the second wave.
The Dutch approach gradually appeared effective in bending the curve. It
is no surprise, then, that Rutte continuously communicated the importance of
sticking with the imposed crisis regime. The eyes of the nation were trained
on the number of corona patients in IC-beds. While the number of patients
went down, adherence to the crisis regime became the norm.
When the moment came to decide on whether and how to loosen
restrictions, the pragmatic approach had all but disappeared. The prime
minister now embraced the precautionary principle: a loosening of the
crisis regime would only be possible if that would not have any negative
effects. But when people became impatient – the hospitals emptying out,
businesses bleeding money, and, importantly, the weather finally turning
nice – pressure to relax the regime increased rapidly. Rutte grudgingly
turned pragmatic again: many restrictions were lifted (including the
opening of bars, brothels and gyms), but festivals were still not allowed.
The mayors of the big cities were allowed to experiment with measures
such as the (mandatory) wearing of face masks. Rutte issued a clear
warning: a new spike in cases would lead to a return of crisis measures
(as happened in the late fall).
Germany
The German response to COVID-19 was fairly similar to the Dutch approach.
Despite an early cluster of cases in Munich in late January and a lockdown of
one regional council in early March (Heinsberg), the response until 12 March
aimed to continue social and economic activities whilst relying on administra-
tive capacities to trace and isolate those infected with the virus. By early
March a growing number of infections increased political pressure to
ensure that health system capacity would be maintained. In response,
German states agreed on a range of measures without full knowledge as to
which measures (and their combined effect) would reduce transmission
rates (Desson et al., 2020).
On 8 March, large events (1000 guests or more) were advised to be can-
celled and working from home was encouraged. On 10 March, Health minis-
ter Spahn announced that hospitals would have to delay planned operations
to create extra capacity for COVID patients. On 11 March, Chancellor Merkel
10 A. BOIN AND M. LODGE
and Federal President Steinmeier appealed for citizens to pursue social dis-
tancing. On 13 March, schools were closed in the majority of Germany’s
federal states. On 16 March, Germany closed its borders, bars, clubs and thea-
tres. Social gatherings were banned and conditions were imposed on can-
teens and restaurants (Robinet-Borgomano, 2020).
The German approach required a federal orchestration of the Länder gov-
ernments’ decisions (who, constitutionally, were in charge of public health).
The Länder established their measures somewhat inconsistently and at
different times. Merkel negotiated with the prime ministers of the Länder
to formulate a unified approach, which was announced on 22 March.
Federal legislation of 25 March enabled the federal government to take
exceptional public health matters normally reserved for Land governments
(Robinet-Borgomano, 2020). When the crisis regime was firmly in place, a
principled approach reigned.
The ‘easing’ of crisis measures, as in the Dutch case, was characterized
by pragmatism. Soon after the declaration of the lockdown, debates
about easing of measures emerged. These were, in part, driven by
Länder governments that had seen low infection rates and therefore
regarded the measures as too stringent and disproportionate. These
pressures, and the lack of constitutional authority, meant that the
federal government had to compromise with those Länder eager to
proceed with easing. An intergovernmental agreement on 15 April
allowed for a partial reopening of social and economic life after the 4th
of May (e.g., reopening of schools and shops, and mandatory facemasks)
with gradual ‘easing’ of measures subsequently (announced on 30 April
and 6 May) (Robinet-Borgomano, 2020).
The United Kingdom
Prime Minister Johnson entered the crisis with a principled approach that was
premised on the critical importance of continued economic activity (Gaskell
et al., 2020). A lockdown was out of the question. Policymakers warned
that undue haste in responding to COVID-19 would represent panicked
knee-jerk responses.
Johnson publicly downplayed the risk and did not take charge of the
response. Johnson let his Secretary of Health, Matt Hancock, chair the first
five COBRA meetings. Johnson visited hospitals with COVID patients and
shook their hands after reiterating the importance of hand-washing (for as
long as singing Happy Birthday twice). A festival with more than 240,000
guests took place whilst 6 people had already died because of COVID. An
economic support package was established before the first (real) measures
were implemented (Morales et al., 2020). In the meantime, schools reported
that parents were withdrawing their children from classes and the British
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population voiced its discontent on Twitter, using the hashtag ‘#Whereis-
Boris’ (Ellyatt, 2020).
On 16 March, Johnson suddenly changed course and announced the
imminence of far-reaching measures. The Government subsequently shut
down the schools (18 March), pubs and other social activities (20 March).
On 23 March, Johnson announced a lockdown, including the shutting of
non-essential economic activities, limits on leaving one’s home as well as a
ban on all social contacts (Embury-Dennis, 2020). It marked a shift from
one principled approach (economy as key value) to another (public health
as key value) – within the course of one week.
When the new crisis regime was in place, Johnson was hospitalized (in
intensive care) with the virus (other cabinet ministers and experts were
also tested positive for the virus) (Morales et al., 2020). Subsequent crisis com-
munication, especially following the prime minister’s recovery, was under-
mined when his key advisor, Cummings, was shown to have violated the
rules of movement without resigning (unlike others who were shown to
have violated lockdown rules).
A pseudo-pragmatic approach was chosen in the form of five indicators
to guide the easing of the lockdown conditions. An ongoing tension
existed between those in the government who believed in the need for
a rapid return of economic activity and those warning against an early
easing (the prime minister himself was said to be in the latter camp follow-
ing his experience in intensive care as COVID-19 patient) (Morales et al.,
2020). In pragmatic vain, Johnson suggested that the subsequent handling
of local outbreaks would resemble a ‘whack a mole’ exercise (Sky News,
2020). A partial re-opening was permitted as of 4 July, although sub-
sequent adjustments in terms of travel-related quarantine rules as well
as a ‘re-tightening’ of some rules accompanied continued concern with
the possibility of a second wave.
Sweden3
The Swedish response closely followedWHO guidelines. The Swedes adopted
a limited set of rules that relied on a mixture of voluntary adherence and a
sense of civic responsibility. Gatherings of more than 50 people were discour-
aged, secondary schools and universities were closed, bars and restaurants
had to maintain social distancing measures, and visits to nursing homes
were banned. The government asked the Swedes to work from home and
act sensibly. By and large, the Swedes could live their lives unimpeded.
Other countries also began with this approach, but Sweden was one of the
few countries that stuck with this approach (up to November 2020). Sweden
was also one of the few countries that did not initiate a governmental crisis
regime marked by centralization. The Swedes had little choice, as their
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constitution forbids a centralized crisis regime (cf. Pierre, 2020). The crisis
response is placed in the hands of the health agency and local administration.
State epidemiologist Anders Tegnell became the international face of the
Swedish approach.
The Swedish approach resulted in a (comparatively) high number of fatal-
ities. Yet, Tegnell stuck with the chosen regime. Even after admitting that the
regime had not worked as expected, he did not adapt. Politicians and science
colleagues asked for an adaptation of the regime, as the situation kept dete-
riorating, especially in comparison to other Nordic countries. The initial
approach remained beyond reproach (Claeson & Hanson, 2020).
In hindsight, we can see that Sweden maintained a principled approach
throughout the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis. The Swedish approach
initially seemed to betray an evidence-based inclination, as the set of pre-
scriptions followed the long-standing WHO guidelines. But whereas the
WHO adapted its guidelines, the Swedes did not. They did not fine-tune
measures in light of signals that the approach was not working (until much
later in the year when the second wave hit). The Swedes stuck with the
initial approach, refusing to adopt measures that were widely adopted else-
where (such as the wearing of facemasks). It gradually became clear that the
Swedes refused to prioritize public health over other policy values (Claeson &
Hanson, 2020).
Exploring similarities and differences
When we interpret the country vignettes from a ‘pragmatic-principled’ point
of view, we see that the crisis responses display some variance (Table 4). Two
countries began with a pragmatic approach (the Netherlands and Germamy).
Both the UK and Sweden began with a principled stance in favour of main-
taining economic and social life to the largest extent possible. The UK per-
formed a U-turn to an equally principled stance in favour of a lockdown
when the earlier stance was no longer seen as viable. Three of the countries
(the exception being Sweden) pivoted towards a more principled policy
emphasis on the value of public health.
Once the three countries had decided to move out of lockdown, the
approach taken was pragmatist at heart: a continuous evaluation of (local)
trends and a fine-tuning of nation-wide measures. The ‘dance’ with the
Table 4. Overview of national responses.
Early crisis Crisis regime Exit strategy
Sweden Principled Principled Principled
Netherlands Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic
Germany Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic
UK Principled Principled Pragmatic
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virus was pursued with a dominant strategy of only ‘easing’ when previous
easements had been shown not to have caused negative effects.
In short, we see a continuum rather than pure ideal-types. We have learned
that countries can change tack, which prompts intriguing questions about
the drivers of these crisis responses. Intriguingly, we see that pragmatist
approaches have underlying decision rules that can shift over time as well.
In the early phase, further economic damage was only tolerated when
public health concerns touched a certain (and invisible) threshold. The exit
strategy reversed that decision rule: economic gains were only tolerated if
public health would not suffer as a result. It reveals the importance for prag-
matists to have a decision-rule as to whether to err on the side of Type 1 or
Type 2 errors when making decisions in view of imminent feedback
processes.
Towards understanding dynamics
The interesting question that emerges from our brief exploration of national
approaches to the COVID-19 crisis, in our view, pertains to the shifts in these
approaches. With the exception of Sweden, each country employed different
decision modes. Here we consider whether the three factors introduced
earlier – perceived uncertainty of health risk, administrative feasibility and
political necessity –might point to a possible explanation of these dynamics.
We organize our discussion in three phases: the initial approach, the regime
phase, and the exit phase. We should emphasize that this is a preliminary dis-
cussion, which is in need of more detailed empirics (that will no doubt mate-
rialize in the near future).
#1 Initial approach: wait and see
Each of the four countries were initially committed to a policy that did not
include lockdowns. This is interesting, especially in view of the Chinese
and Italian templates that many other countries followed. Looking
across the three factors, we can see the lack of conditions that would
attract politicians to call for immediate lockdowns, or, at least, forewarn
publics of such a likely scenario. This initially created room for a cautious
approach (a pragmatic approach) or a principled embrace of economic
well-being as a policy driver.
Perceived uncertainty: how bad is this, really? Early 2020, experts in the four
countries did not consider the risk of the virus spreading as particularly high
and the mortality rates were seen as not particular worrying, even though
some Chinese scientists (and subsequently Italian experts) were warning
that the virus was highly contagious and many patients were asymptomatic.
But ‘hard’ evidence was initially in short supply. When evidence became avail-
able, it came in the form of stories from overflowing hospitals. Scientific
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modelling suggested high mortality numbers if nothing was done to curb
community transmission.
While the need to act became clear, it remained unclear what the effects of
interventions in societal life would be on the propagation of the virus. Three
countries (the UK being the exception) built on the WHO guidelines to chart a
course, strengthening measures as those in place proved insufficient. Uncer-
tainty still reigned, but a response was found that seemed to work. Emerging
certainty pointed to the need for a principled adherence to the ‘discovered’
regime.
Administrative feasibility: we can handle this. The uncertainty surrounding
the virus met with robust trust among both experts and policymakers in
the state of preparedness of their public health systems. Playbooks (including
track and trace procedures) and organizational structures (such as the Out-
break Management Team and the SAGE group) were activated. Previous out-
breaks – SARS, MERS, Ebola and Swine flu – had all been controlled and
seemed to affirm the soundness of institutional arrangements that were in
place. Preventive measures – cancel Carnival activities, prohibit mass
events such as football competitions – were regarded as unnecessary. This
collective perception of impregnability cancelled the need for a principled
approach predicated on the protection of public health and facilitated the
idea that a pragmatist approach could work.
Political necessity: no need to kill our economy. In February, when the first
cases were just materializing in our four countries, economists and politicians
in international forums were widely discussing the economic consequences
of the total lockdown in China and Italy. The initial inclination in all four
countries was to avoid a total lockdown and rely on a set of milder interven-
tions. Existing WHO (2006) guidelines advised against far-reaching measures
on the grounds that they were unproven and the modern citizen would not
tolerate them for even a brief time period. The adoption of a science-based
approach provided politicians with a story line explaining why a complete
lockdown – widely imposed in surrounding countries – was not necessary
(at least not yet).
The United Kingdom pivoted towards a lockdown when the Imperial
College report caused a sensational scare, predicting a wave of deaths and
thus pressuring prime minister Johnson to explain the lack of measures in
the UK.4 His initial principled approach could only be met with a dramatic
U-turn, towards another principled approach. The other countries had
much more room to manoeuvre.
#2 Sticking it out
We noted that all countries moved to a principled adherence of the set of
policy measures that appeared to work. The Netherlands, Germany and the
UK migrated towards a full adoption of a ‘principled precautionary’ approach
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so as to reduce transmission channels. The protection of the population at
large from the virus became the primary objective or value. Sweden was a
bit of an exception: even though its approach did not prove effective immedi-
ately, the country stuck with the principled belief in the chosen approach.
Let’s see if the three factors can help shed light on the embrace of a prin-
cipled approach in this phase.
Persistent uncertainties, growing effectiveness. While little was learned
about the exact causal relations between initiated measures and intended
outcomes, the curve began to flatten in each country. This gave the
impression that the set of imposed measures – different as they might be
in each country – was working. The temptation to experiment and see if
the flattening might be ‘sped up’ was curtailed by the realization that the
unintended consequences might well outweigh the limited gains (how fast
could a curve be flattened, after all?). Crucially, few countries in Europe
were doing a quicker job. There was thus a natural tendency to stick with
what seemed to work.
The limits of administration. With the possible exception of Germany, the
countries lacked the means to initiate experiments and collect the fine-
grained feedback needed to assess the results of such experiments. In
Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, ‘tracking and tracing’ capacities were
overwhelmed by the growing number of cases. The one crisis indicator
that could be easily and accurately measured was the number of IC beds
occupied by COVID-patients. That indicator was too crude to measure the
effects of any experiments that might be considered. Moreover, looming
shortages of health system capacity (IC beds and ventilators) and the lack
of supplies (such as protective equipment) appeared on the radar as a
threat to the continuity of the health system.
Political necessity: the rising need for a consistent approach. Social dis-
tancing measures require a high degree of voluntary compliance by indi-
viduals and companies alike. To reinforce social norms of solidarity, crisis
communication is essential. Leaders needed a simple yet compelling story
to persuade the public. Calls for solidarity do not sit well with the incon-
sistencies that come with ‘experimentalism’. Imposing measures in one
jurisdiction raise the spectre of social activities moving towards those jur-
isdictions that are ‘still open’. Politically, such ‘racing’ among jurisdictions
is highly problematic and is resolved by formulating a unified national
response.
#3 Towards the exit
In three countries, we identified a Pragmatic turn when it was time to design
an exit strategy. The easing was cautious. Gradual steps were taken to assess
potential impacts on public health, enabling both gradual loosening and
immediate tightening-up of measures in view of infection rate developments.
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There was also a growing call to decentralize decision-making, which, in turn,
gave rise to criticism concerning inconsistencies in approach (such as school
opening guidelines).
Uncertainty: the virus might return. Demands on the health system were
declining, but experts had learned how contagious the virus was. They
warned that a quick return to normal would give the virus an opportunity
to strike again (causing a ‘second wave’). It was clear that heightened virus
infection rates would follow if caution was cast in the wind. A relaxation of
measures was possible, but it had to be slow and with an eye on negative
effects. A pragmatist approach fitted the bill perfectly.
Administrative feasibility: growing capacity to be pragmatic. The new admin-
istrative challenge was to design and enforce the post-lockdown regime.
While this would require additional street-level capacities, at least it was a
familiar challenge that could be decentralized to regional and municipal
administrations. It helped that testing and tracing capacities (despite all
imperfections) were ramped up, protective gear became available and the
number of IC-beds had been expanded. Allowing these lower-level adminis-
trations an enhanced degree of discretion was a nice fit with a pragmatic
approach of experimentation.
Political necessity: pressure to loosen up. Political leaders faced the paradox
of success: the more effective the crisis regime, the less likely people were to
continue adhering to the rules; eroding adherence undermined the effective-
ness of the response. Pressure for relaxation emerged from the business
sector, social media personalities and select tabloid newspapers. While
public health considerations prohibited a rapid relaxation of measures, the
crisis regime was becoming politically problematic, especially as, for
example, in Germany, the federal government had no authority over
measures taken by the Länder. A Pragmatic approach – feeling your way
towards an uncertain future, backed with the perceived reassurance of
sufficient administrative capacity – thus became an attractive option. The
promise of relaxation as a reward for responsible behaviour: it was an
approach that political leaders could sell.
Conclusion: reconsidering the merits of the principled-
pragmatic distinction
This paper studies how political crisis managers craft a crisis response under
conditions of pervasive uncertainty. It focuses attention on the nexus
between crisis management and political leadership, asking how political
(and other) decision-makers approach critical dilemmas without the infor-
mation they might have in ‘normal’ times. More specifically, it aims to
explore whether the distinction between pragmatist and principled
approaches has any analytical purchase. Moreover, we seek to identify
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factors that can help to understand why countries adopt pragmatic or prin-
cipled approaches (or shift from one to the other).
We think that the proposed distinction provides a heuristic device to
describe, categorize and compare national responses to crisis events charac-
terized by prolonged uncertainty. The paper demonstrates the differences
between these two ideal-typical approaches. It also shows areas of overlap.
A principled approach will not completely shun or disregard information
feedback processes or rule out the adjustment of policy settings. Similarly,
a pragmatist approach cannot operate without some form of basic (prin-
cipled) policy setting as to how to weigh different objectives. And, indeed,
a pragmatist approach may culminate in a strategy that may appear rather
principled.
We do think that further work is needed on the refinement of the indi-
cators that we used to identify both approaches. These are, in effect, rough
indicators that can be used to describe the nature of a national crisis
response. It would be great if indicators could be developed and validated
for the measurement of leadership intentions rather than policy responses.
Further work is clearly needed.
We conclude that a pragmatist approach may serve political leaders
well in a prolonged period of uncertainty. It can only work, however, if
highly demanding preconditions are met. In addition, it should allow for
the possibility that a more principled approach may be necessary, at
least for a period of time. Once a winning formula is found, leaders are
very reluctant to let it go (even if there might be a better approach). It
takes away any incentive to gamble with something that appears to
work. A principled approach makes sense, then, by rationalizing on ration-
ality in precautionary ways when the only thing you know is that the
chosen approach appears to be working. Perfection is the enemy of the
good, as NASA engineers used to say.
This paper also prompts new questions, especially with regard to the
dynamics of crisis approaches that need to be employed for a relatively
long period of time. One question in need of further contemplation pertains
to the political and administrative benefits of these two approaches. In some
cases, a principled approach appears to offer not just political expediency
(leaders are able to show that they are taking decisive action), but also
implies administrative necessity. The proposed benefits of the pragmatist
approach presume certain, highly demanding administrative pre-requisites,
given its reliance on feedback processes. Our cases suggest that pragmatism
may indeed be hard to maintain in the thick of a crisis. Moreover, we did not
see any serious efforts to set up experiments that might lead to a more
effective crisis response. It simply may be too difficult to explain the inherent
inconsistencies of such an approach. A continuous ‘loosen and tighten’
pattern makes it hard to generate widespread compliance.
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In other words, our findings suggest that the distinction between a prag-
matist and a principled approach might be a bit too simplistic. The key ques-
tion that emerges here is whether a principled approach may not be part of a
more overarching pragmatist approach. If you can switch from one principled
stance to another, the underlying principles of either approach may not be as
hardwired as our initial discussion suggested. A principled approach may well
be the outcome of a pragmatist process (a lesson learned through trial and
error). Perhaps we should consider the possibility that a principled approach
is simply a tool in a pragmatist approach.
It would be helpful if we could say something about the effectiveness of
either approach. Unfortunately, it is simply too early to make any claims
with regard to the effectiveness of national responses. In due course, an ava-
lanche of information with regard to the different COVID-19 regimes in these
and other countries will undoubtedly emerge. It is still likely that ‘success’ and
‘failure’ will be viewed through different prisms as the history of this pan-
demic is being rewritten at different points in the future (cf. Boin et al.,
2008). The question, then, may be one of political feasibility: which approach
allows for the discovery of a workable and legitimate approach to the threat
at hand?
Notes
1. McConnell and ‘t Hart (2019) introduce a third approach: inaction. As our space
is limited, we do not discuss it here.
2. The Dutch case description is based on Boin et al. (2020).
3. We based the Swedish case description on Engström et al. (2021) and Pierre
(2020).
4. We are referring to the widely cited ‘report 9’ of 16 March 2019 put forwarded




We thank the reviewers for their excellent suggestions. We are indebted to Marte
Luesink for her assistance in the preparation of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Arjen Boin is a professor of Public Institutions and Governance at the Institute of Pol-
itical Science, Leiden University. He is also a consultant at Crisisplan BV.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 19
Martin Lodge is a professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE’s Depart-





Allison, G. (1971). The essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little
Brown.
Ansell, C. K. (2011). Pragmatist democracy: Evolutionary learning as public philosophy.
Oxford University Press.
Ansell, C. K., & Bartenberger, M. (2019). Pragmatism and political crisis management:
Principle and practical rationality during the financial crisis. Edward Elgar.
Ansell, C. K., & Boin, A. (2019). Taming deep uncertainty: The potential of pragmatist prin-
ciples for understanding and improving strategic crisis management. Administration &
Society, 51(7), 1079–1112. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399717747655
Ansell, C. K., Boin, A., & ‘t Hart, P. (2014). Political leadership in times of crisis. In R.
Rhodes & P. ‘t Hart (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political leadership (pp. 418–
433). Oxford University Press.
Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (Eds.). (2019). The blind spots of public bureaucracy and the poli-
tics of non-coordination. Palgrave Macmillan.
Boin, A., McConnell, A., & ‘t Hart, P. (Eds.). (2008). Governing after crisis. Cambridge
University Press.
Boin, A., Overdijk, W., Van der Ham, C., Hendriks, J., & Sloof, D. (2020). COVID-19: Een
analyse van de nationale crisisrespons. Crisis University Press.
Boin, A., ‘t Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2016). The politics of crisis management.
Cambridge University Press.
Brecher, M. (1993). Crises in world politics: Theory and reality. Pergamon Press.
Claeson, M., & Hanson, S. (2020). COVID-19 and the Swedish enigma. The Lancet, 397
(10271), 259–261. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32750-1
Daviter, F. (2019). Policy analysis in the face of complexity: What kind of knowledge to
tackle wicked problems?. Public Policy and Administration, 34(1), 62–83. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0952076717733325
Desson, Z., Lambertz, L., Peters, J. W., Falkenbach, M., & Kauer, L. (2020). Europe’s
Covid-19 outliers: German, Austrian and Swiss policy responses during the early
stages of the 2020 pandemic. Health Policy and Technology, 9(4), 405–418.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.09.003
Dewey, J. (1929). The quest for certainty. Minton, Balch.
Dror, Y. (2001). The capacity to govern. Routledge.
Ellyatt, H. (2020, March 16). Where is Boris?: The UK government’s cautious coronavirus
strategy provokes a public backlash. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/16/
coronavirus-uk-public-backlash-against-lack-of-restrictions.html
Embury-Dennis, T. (2020, March 21). Coronavirus: A timeline of how Britain went from
‘low risk’ to an unprecedented national shutdown. The Independent. https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/coronavirus-uk-timeline-deaths-cases-
covid-19-nhs-social-distancing-a9416331.html
20 A. BOIN AND M. LODGE
Engström, A., Luesink, M., & Boin, A. (2021). From creeping to full-blown crisis: Lessons
from the Dutch and Swedish response to COVID-19. In A. Boin, M. Ekengren, & M.
Rhinard (Eds.), Understanding the creeping crisis (pp. 105–130). Palgrave MacMillan.
Farjoun, M., Ansell, C., & Boin, A. (2015). Pragmatism in organization studies: Meeting
the challenges of a dynamic and complex world. Organization Science, 26(6), 1787–
1804. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2015.1016
Gaskell, J., Stoker, G., Jennings, W., & Devine, D. (2020). Covid-19 and the blunders of
our governments. Political Quarterly, 91(3), 523–533. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
923X.12894
Hermann, C. (1963). Some consequences of crisis which limit the viability of organiz-
ations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 8(1): 61–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/
2390887
Hood, C. (2011). The blame game. Princeton University Press.
Hood, C., & Lodge, M. (2005). Pavlovian innovation, pet solutions and economizing on
rationality? In J. Black, M. Lodge, & M. Thatcher (Eds.), Regulatory innovation (pp.
138–155). Edward Elgar.
Lodge, M. (2019). Accounting for blind spots. In T. Bach & K. Wegrich (Eds.), The blind
spots of public bureaucracy and the politics of non-coordination (pp. 29–48). Palgrave.
Lodge, M., & Hood, C. (2010). Competency and bureaucracy: Diffusion, application and
appropriate response?. West European Politics, 26(3), 131–152. https://doi.org/10.
1080/01402380312331280618
Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (2016). The rationality paradox of nudge: Rational tools of
government in a world of bounded rationality. Law & Policy, 38(3), 250–267.
https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12056
McConnell, A., & ‘t Hart, P. (2019). Inaction and public policy: Understanding why pol-
icymakers ‘do nothing’. Policy Sciences, 52(4), 645–661. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11077-019-09362-2
Menand, L. (2001). The metaphysical club. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Merton, R. K. (1936). The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.
American Sociological Review, 1(6), 894–904. https://doi.org/10.2307/2084615
Morales, A., Ring, S., Hutton, R., & Paton, J. (2020, April 24). How the alarm went off too
late in Britain’s virus response. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2020-04-24/coronavirus-uk-how-boris-johnson-s-government-let-virus-
get-away
Parker, C. F., Persson, T., & Widmalm, S. (2019). The effectiveness of national and EU-
level civil protection systems: Evidence from 17 member states. Journal of
European Public Policy, 26(9), 1312–1334. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.
1523219
Peters, G. (2015). Advanced introduction to public policy. Edward Elgar.
Pierre, J. (2020). Nudges against pandemics: Sweden’s COVID-19 containment strategy
in perspective. Policy and Society, 39(3), 478–493. https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.
2020.1783787
Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy
Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730
Robinet-Borgomano, A. (2020, 17 April). Europe versus Coronavirus – Germany, a resi-
lient model. Institute Montaigne. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/
states-facing-coronavirus-crisis-germany-resilient-model
Rosenthal, U., Charles, M., & ‘t Hart, P. (Eds.). (1989). Coping with crisis. Charles
C. Thomas.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 21
Sky News. (2020, May 11). Coronavirus: Prime minister says ‘we’ll be doing whack-a-
mole’ on local flare-ups. https://news.sky.com/video/coronavirus-prime-minister-
says-well-be-doing-whack-a-mole-on-local-flare-ups-11986745
WHO Writing Group. (2006). Non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic
influenza, international measures. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 12(1), 81–87.
https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1201.051370
22 A. BOIN AND M. LODGE
